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Abstract
This paper examines the effect of board characteristics on accounting return in
Indonesian banking industry. The conceptual framework borrows from agency
theory claiming that board is held liable for monitoring responsibilities and
that monitoring effectiveness will lead to higher corporate achievement. Yet the
theory predicts that board characteristics matter in constituting firm perfor-
mance. It is hypothesized that leadership structure, representation of indepen-
dent directors, board size, and the rank of college board chairperson attended
are necessary attributes enable the board to deliver better performance. The
investigation is based on a dataset consisting of 83 banks during 2009-2015.
Panel data analysis reveal that the proportion of independent directors, board
leadership structure, and board size shows insignificant influence. The rank of
universities the board chairperson graduated is found to have an impact on
accounting earnings. The impact is robust after the type of controlling owners is
taken into account. Yet the association between university rank and perfor-
mance is more pronounced in the listed-banks.
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Abstrak
Penelitian ini menelaah efek karateristik dewan komisaris terhadap laba akuntansi pada
industri perbankan di Indonesia. Kerangka konseptual mengikuti teori keagenan yang
memprediksi bahwa struktur kepemimpinan, representasi komisaris independen, ukuran
dewan komisaris, dan ranking universitas tempat ketua dewan komisaris bersekolah
merupakan atribut penting dalam menghasilkan kinerja keuangan bank. Penelitian
dilakukan dengan didasarkan pada sampel yang terdiri dari 85 bank dalam periode
tahun 2009-2015. Analisa panel data menunjukkan bahwa struktur kepemimpinan,
representasi komisaris independen, dan ukuran dewan komisaris merupakan prediktor
kinerja akuntansi yang insignifikan. Ranking universitas tempat ketua dewan komisaris
bersekolah menunjukkan pengaruh positif terhadap laba akuntansi. Pengaruh tersebut
menjadi kuat setelah tipe pengendali diperhitungkan. Hubungan antara peringkat uni-
versitas dan kinerja lebih kuat di bank-bank yang terdaftar di bursa efek.
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Corporate governance has been claimed as a neces-
sary condition for corporate growth and survival.
While extensive papers have examined the effect of
corporate governance on organizational perfor-
mance, yet they heavily focus on non-financial firm
and less attention has been devoted to financial in-
stitutions, particularly banking industry. Leventis
& Dimitropoulos (2012) describe that banks are the
most important element of financial systems and the
failure of banking industry might jeopardize the
whole economic system of any given country. In-
deed banking industry has been quoted as having
unique characteristics that differs from other sec-
tors (Kanagaretnam, Lim, & Lobo, 2010). This, in
part, explains why banking industry needs specific
regulatory system to mitigate the risk of failure that
results in displaysdistinct pattern of governance
structure. The distinctive pattern eventually serves
a basis for rationalizing the notion that the effect of
governance mechanisms on organizational outcome
might be industry-specific (Leventis, Dimitropoulos,
& Owusu-Ansah, 2013). This view suggests that the
findings of non-bank-based study might not be ap-
plicable to banking industry. Accordingly, investi-
gation of the role of governance mechanisms in re-
lation to firm performance in banking industry, par-
ticularly in emerging market, is required.
Firm-level governance might consist of vari-
ous mechanisms that forms specific governance port-
folio systematically designed to fulfill firm specific
environment. However, the board of directors has
been quoted as the apex of firm-level governance
responsible for serving as first-line defense against
opportunistic behavior of management (Denis & Mc
Connell, 2003). Yet, governance research believes
that the characteristics of directors might dictate
board effectiveness in fulfilling their responsibility
(O’Sullivan, Mamun & Hassan, 2016; Haque, 2017;
Ng & Thosuwanchot, 2017). This view suggests that
board characteristics might serve as an influential
predictor of organizational outcome. In this paper,
investigate the link between the board characteris-
tics and accounting performance of banking indus-
try in Indonesia. Using a dataset consisting of 83
banks for the period of 2009-2015, the analysis re-
veal that the proportion of independent directors,
board leadership structure, and board size shows
insignificant influence. The rank of universities the
board chairperson graduated is found to have an
impact on accounting earnings. The impact is robust
after controlling for the type of controlling owners.
Yet the association between university rank and
performance is more pronounced in the listed-banks.
This paper makes two contributions to gov-
ernance literature. First, I combine personal charac-
teristics and education of board chairperson and thus
provide an insight how the simultaneous effect of
those properties might shape board monitoring ef-
fectiveness and, therefore, organizational work.
Second, I control for the strength of market for cor-
porate control that stems from different bank char-
acteristics.
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Agency theory hinges upon the assumption
that individuals are solely motivated by self-inter-
est (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Within corporate con-
text, the underlying assumption implies that agents
prefer to act in the best of their interest that might
potentially harm shareholders’ wealth. Accordingly,
it is asserted that firm value, as a measure of share-
holder wealth, is an inverse function of opportunis-
tic behavior of corporate executive. Although prin-
cipal-agent relationship might rely on mutually
agreed contract to mitigate agency problem, Baiman
(1990) argue that naturally contract is incomplete
due to the bounded capability of individual to fore-
see any possible future contingency. Therefore, the
finance literature proposed corporate governance
mechanisms, as the second best solution, to align
the interests of contracting parties.
While check and balance system might con-
sist of various mechanisms, Denis and Sarin sug-
gest that the board of directors is at the apex of the
corporate governance. Within agency framework,
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the board is primarily responsible to monitor man-
agement in order to protect the interests of share-
holders (Zahra & Pearce, 1989; Hung, 1998). Effec-
tive board monitoring has been claimed as enhanc-
ing the sensitivity of agents’ performance to the la-
bor market and thereby potentially discouraging the
agents from pursuing self-interest actions (Alchian
& Demsetz, 1972; Fama, 1980). Accordingly, the ef-
fectiveness of the board in fulfilling monitoring func-
tion would manifest in the organizational achieve-
ment. However, the characteristics of the directors
serving on the board have been claimed as consti-
tuting the effectiveness of the board in fulfilling
monitoring responsibility (Eugene F. Fama & Jensen,
1983; Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990). This view sug-
gests that particular board characteristics, to some
extent, give an influence on corporate performance.
Accordingly, the growing body of research has tried
to obtain empirical evidence on the link between
board characteristics and various organizational
outcome such as, among others, financial perfor-
mance (Rodriguez-Fernandez, Fernandez-Alonso, &
Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 2014), corporate social re-
sponsibility (Chang et al., 2017), and audit report
lag (Basuony et al., 2016). Literature posts that board
characteristics might refer to independence, board
size, and educational attainment.
Board Independence and Size
Within agency theory, board independence
has been quoted as the most important determinant
of board monitoring effectiveness. This view is
rooted on the premise that being independence of
management is a necessary condition to enable the
board to exercise objective judgment of managerial
performance. Eventually, objective judgment has
been quoted as enhancing the likelihood of market
for corporate control to work properly and thus put
a pressure on management to perform better. There-
fore, the board would effectively exercise monitor-
ing role whenever it comprises independent direc-
tors sufficiently (Adams & Ferreira, 2007). They ar-
gue that having sufficient outside directors on the
board represents the separation between manage-
ment decisions and control decisions that provides
the board with authority to scrutinize management
actions. While the concept of independence is a
multidimensional discussion, Raheja (2005) argues
that board independence is best represented by
outside directors without any affiliations with man-
agement, of which the fate of those directors is un-
constrained by management decisions. Accordingly,
agency literature predicts that the firm performance
would be enhanced with higher proportion of out-
side directors serving on the board (Dalton et al.,
1998).
Complementary to the representation of out-
side directors, Hopt & Leyens (2004) suggest that
firm might structure their board leadership as ei-
ther being combined or separated. Agency theory
suggest that leadership structure drives board in-
dependence and therefore board effectiveness in
fulfilling monitoring responsibility (Fosberg &
Nelson, 1999; Krause, Semadeni, & Cannella Jr,
2014). This view is based on the claim that chairper-
son is the most influential actor within the board
and thus might dictate board activities (Adams &
Ferreira, 2007). Fama & Jensen (1983) imply that
separated leadership reflects the presence of sepa-
ration between management and control decisions
and thereby implicitly provides the board with im-
plicit power to control information flows (Baliga,
Moyer & Rao, 1996; Duru, Iyengar, & Zampelli,
2016). Accordingly, separated leadership potentially
encourages board independence and therefore fa-
cilitates the board to effectively and to influence
management behavior (Elsayed, 2007; Lewellyn &
Fainshmidt, 2017). However, separated leadership
might create rivalry between board chairperson and
corporate executive officer (Baliga, Moyer & Rao,
1996; Brickley, Coles & Jarrell, 1997). In other words,
separated leadership potentially offset managerial
discretion that might hinder innovations and busi-
ness opportunities.
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Along with board independence, board size
has been quoted as a determinant of board effec-
tiveness. The importance of board size hinges upon
coordination and information arguments. The co-
ordination argument posits that any given group
with larger number of member is more likely to
experience communication problem that obstructs
coordination among group members. This view sug-
gests smaller board size is more likely to monitor
management effectively. For example, Guest (2009)
observes that board size exhibits negative impact
on Tobin Q and market return while Torchia &
Calabrò (2016) find a negative influence of board
size on corporate transparency. However, informa-
tion argument describes that each director serving
on the board might bring specific knowledge, skill,
and network that benefits the firm. Therefore, larger
board potentially delivers better monitoring and
advice to management that lead to superior perfor-
mance (Romano & Guerrini, 2014). Given the con-
flicting effect, Gaur, Bathula, & Singh (2015) pro-
pose a contingency model on the link between board
size and organizational outcome. In support to this
notion, the effect of board size and corporate per-
formance has been documented as conditional to,
among others, the strength of monitoring commit-
tee (Upadhyay, Bhargava, & Faircloth, 2014) and
corporate life cycle (Wahba & Elsayed, 2014).
College Quality the Chairperson Attended
Educational background has been quoted as
determining cognitive ability of any given individual
(Unger et al., 2009) that drives attitude towards in-
novation (Barker III & Mueller, 2002) and creative
problem-solving (Bantel & Jackson, 1989). In other
words, cognitive base drives individual ability to
cope with specific complexity of an environment and
assignment (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). However,
the link between any given educational background
and cognitive ability might vary across the quality
of college the chairperson attended. Resources-
based perspective posits that higher quality colleges
provide better academic staffs and necessary re-
sources and therefore permit them to offer supe-
rior research and teaching (Wright, 1988;
McGuinness, 2003). Accordingly, graduates from
higher quality colleges are perceived as having com-
petitive advantage and higher problem-solving ca-
pability that lead to higher wage (Li et al., 2012).
However, self-fulfilling perspective disputes the
value added created by higher quality colleges
(Hartog, Sun, & Ding, 2010). Indeed, this perspec-
tive suggests that the competitive advantage of
higher quality colleges hinges upon the qualifica-
tion of enrolling student. Particularly, the perspec-
tive argues that higher quality college attract pro-
spective student with higher academic qualification
(Black, Smith, & Daniel, 2005) and thereby dispute
the superior quality proclaimed by particular col-
lege. Nevertheless, both resources-based and self-
fulfilling perspectives conclude that higher quality
colleges provide important signal to labor market
that their graduates are characterized with better
cognitive ability to engage in problem-solving as-
signment (Long, 2008; Drydakis, 2016).
METHODS
The investigation relies on a dataset compris-
ing banks operating in Indonesia during 2009-2015.
The list of all banks is obtained from the central
bank (Bank Indonesia). The data source relies on
annual report, of which is manually downloaded
from company website. The sample excludes bank-
years with unavailable annual report. Further, we
delete observations with unavailable information in
annual report. Subject to these procedures, the final
sample consists of 83 banks (520 observations). To
address possible concerns about outliers, all con-
tinuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentiles (Vafeas & Vlittis, 2016).
The effect of board characteristics on account-
ing performance is investigated by estimating the
following model:
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ROEit = b1 LEAD it + b2 IND it + b3 BDSZ it + b4
SCRANK it + b5 ACSZ it + b6 OWN5it  +  b7
BRCH it +  b8 FRAGE it + b8 DTE it +  eit
All tests is conducted using panel data OLS
regressions. Firm and year is denoted as subscripts
i and t respectively. In this study, accounting-based
measure, in particular return on equity (ROE) is
adopted as a proxy of bank’s financial performance
since not all banks in our sample are publicly traded
on stock exchanges. The ROE defined as the ratio
of income after taxes to total equity. Leadership
structure (CHAIND) is dummy variable that takes
1 if an independent director serves as board chair-
person and 0 otherwise. The proportion of inde-
pendent directors (COMIND) is the number of in-
dependent directors divided by total number of
directors. Board size (TMTSZ) is the number of di-
rectors serving on the board. The university rank
(SCRANK) is a 1-7 scale based on the ranking of
university the board chairperson graduated. The
rank relies on global university ranking endorsed
by Times Higher Education. A score of 1 is assigned
to universities within top 1-100, 2 to top 101-200,
and so forth, while a score of 7 is assigned to uni-
versities beyond top 600. The audit committee size
(ACSZ) is the number of directors serving on audit
committee. Ownership (OWN) is defined the ag-
gregate ownership of top 5 shareholders. Firm size
(BRCH) is an ordinal scale that take 1 if the bank
has a maximum of 5 branch offices, 2 has 6-10, and
so forth while the score take 21 if the bank has at
least 101 branch offices. Firm age (FRAGE) is the
year of observation minus the year the bank was
incorporated in log natural form. Debt to Equity
(DTE) is the ratio of total debt to total equity.
RESULTS
Descriptive and Univariate
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of vari-
ables. The average value of the ROE is 0.16 and the
standard deviation is 0.12, while the minimum and
the maximum are -0.18 and 0.44 respectively.
The board chairperson in less than half of the
banks in our sample is held by independent direc-
tor (mean of leadership structure is 0.39) during the
period of observation. The mean of board indepen-
dence is 0.60 while the standard deviation is 0.14.
The largest board consists of 9 directors while the
smallest comprise 1 director, having a mean of 4
and standard deviations of 1.5. The mean value of
university ranks is 3.26 suggesting that, on aver-
age, the board chairperson is graduated from top
200-300 worldwide universities. In some cases,
chairpersons obtain a degree from top 100 universi-
 N Min Max Mean Std 
ROE 506 -0.185   0.440 0.158 0.116 
CHAIND 523  0.000   1.000 0.390 0.488 
COMIND 509  0.250   1.000 0.600 0.144 
COMSZ 520  1.000    9.000 4.067 1.492 
SCRANK 457  1.000  7.000 3.260 1.952 
ACSZ 514  1.000   6.000 3.494 0.881 
OWN5 508  0.556   1.000 0.924 0.125 
BRCH 523  1.000 21.000 16.398 6.346 
FRAGE 488  2.079   4.625 3.532 0.499 
DTE 521  0.125 15.620 6.743 3.258 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
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ties (minimum= 1) while others are graduated from
beyond top 700 universities (max= 7) with standard
deviation of 1.95. The size of audit committee ranges
between 1 and 6 members with a mean value of 4.
Top 5 shareholders, on average, own 92 percent of
common shares with the minimum and maximum
ownership that show scores of 56 percent and 100
percent. Firm’s age ranges between 2.08 and 4.63
with a mean value of 3.53. The debt to equity ratio
varies between 0.13 and 15.6, having a mean and a
standard deviation of 6.7 and 3.2 respectively.
Correlation analysis (Pearson’s) in Table 2
explores bivariate associations among all variables.
ROE correlates with most of independent variables
except with CHAIND, ACSZ, and OWN5. The cor-
relations are as follows, with COMIND (r= “0.08),
with COMSZ (r= 0.09), with SCRANK (r= -0.30),
with BRCH (r= 0.41), with FRAGE (r= 0.30), and
with DTE (r= 0.34). The highest coefficient among
independent variables is found between COMSZ and
BRCH (r= -0.42) showing that the model is less likely
to suffer from multicollinearity problem among in-
dependent variables.
Multivariate
Table 3 shows results of stepwise analysis of
bank performance on board characteristics for the
full sample using baseline model in Equation 1. All
models show relatively high Prob. > chi2 while R2
ranges from 0.23-0.27. Column 1, 2, and 3 respec-
tively reveal that chairperson independence
(CHAIND), the proportion of independent direc-
tors serving on the board (COMIN), and board size
(COMSZ) are insignificant predictors of bank ac-
counting performance. In column 4, the insignificance
effect persists when chairperson independence, the
proportion of independent directors, and board size
are taken into account simultaneously. In column 5
the rank of university board chairperson attended
shows a significant effect on accounting return at 5
percent level. The negative sign indicates that bet-
ter accounting return is more likely to be observed
in the bank with board chairperson graduated from
highest rank universities (better quality). In column
6, the effect of school rank remains significant in
the presence of other board characteristics.
While the previous table empirically confirms
that education matters, agency theory suggests that
internal governance mechanisms requires market for
corporate control, as a necessary condition, to work
well. Based on this premise, we address this issue
by introducing listing status and government own-
ership as surrogates for the strength of market for
corporate control. Table 4 presents estimates from
the basic model, where the sample is decomposed
into two groups based on listing status. The argu-
ment behind this procedure is that listed firms are
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  
ROE 1.00                  
CHAIND 0.05  1.00                
COMIND -0.08 c 0.22 a 1.00              
COMSZ 0.09 c 0.00  -0.28 a 1.00            
SCRANK -0.30 a 0.13 a 0.16 a -0.22 a 1.00          
ACSZ -0.06  0.15 a -0.05  0.39 a 0.09 c 1.00        
OWN5 -0.01  -0.07  0.04  -0.33 a 0.09 c -0.17 a 1.00      
BRCH 0.41 a 0.11 b -0.12 a 0.42 a -0.36 a 0.20 a -0.32 a 1.00    
FRAGE 0.30 a -0.14 a -0.17 a 0.25 a -0.30 a 0.11 b -0.08 c 0.30 a 1.00  
DTE 0.34 a -0.03  -0.06  0.14 a -0.13 a 0.08 c -0.21 a 0.38 a 0.10 b 
Table 2. Correlations (Pearson’s)
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  1  2  3  4  5  6  
_cons Coeff. 0.01  0.03  -0.02  0.01  0.01  0.03  
 z-value 0.13  0.38  -0.23  0.09  0.11  0.34  
CHAIND Coeff. -0.01      0.00    -0.02  
 z-value -1.08      -0.03    -1.21  
COMIND Coeff.   -0.04    -0.03    -0.02  
 z-value   -1.24    -0.88    -0.80  
COMSZ Coeff.     0.00  0.01    0.00  
 z-value     1.04  1.14    -0.55  
SCRANK Coeff.         -0.01 b -0.01 c 
 z-value         -2.13  -1.90  
ACSZ Coeff. -0.01 c -0.01 c -0.01 b -0.01 b -0.02 b -0.02 b 
 z-value -1.78  -1.80  -1.99  -2.01  -2.48  -2.40  
OWN5 Coeff. 0.07  0.07  0.08  0.07  0.08 c 0.08 c 
 z-value 1.35  1.40  1.48  1.46  1.77  1.73  
BRCH Coeff. 0.01 a 0.01 a 0.00 a 0.01 a 0.00 b 0.00 a 
 z-value 3.94  4.05  3.42  3.62  2.39  2.76  
FRAGE Coeff. 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.02  
 z-value -0.01  -0.24  0.25  -0.10  1.06  0.89  
DTE Coeff. 0.01 a 0.01 a 0.01 a 0.01 a 0.01 a 0.01 a 
 z-value 4.46  4.75  4.48  4.78  4.58  4.98  
constant  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year – FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
R2 -overall  0.23  0.24  0.24  0.24  0.27  0.26  
Wald chi2  44.76  49.90  44.33  50.97  53.82  61.09  
Prob> chi2  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Table 3. Regressions of Bank’s Performance on Board Characteristics
more likely to receive vigilant market scrutiny and
therefore market for corporate control is more likely
to work better in the listed firms (Burgstahler, Hail
& Leuz, 2006; Van Tendeloo & Vanstraelen, 2008).
This view suggests that directors of listed firms face
performance pressure and therefore it is expected
that listed firm would display stronger association
between directors’ characteristics and accounting
return. Column 1 reports the results for sub-sample
of non-listed bank. All personal characteristics of
directors (chairperson independence, board inde-
pendence, and board size) fail to produce signifi-
cant effect on corporate performance even at mar-
ginal level. The rank of college remains negatively
related to accounting return at 5 percent significance
level suggesting that directors graduated from top
rank college are more likely to deliver better orga-
nizational outcome. As for control variables, num-
ber of branch, age, and debt to equity ratio are sig-
nificantly affect firm performance suggesting that
larger, older, and lower leveraged bank are more
profitable. In column 2, the insignificant effect of
chairperson independence and board size persist.
However, the proportion of independent directors
becomes negatively affecting accounting return al-
though the statistical significance falls into marginal
level (z-value= -1.74).
Other characteristic that might hamper mar-
ket for corporate control to work well is the exist-
ence of government ownership. It is described that
government ownership might have a specific impact
on public (Untoro, 2017) and internal governance
system that eventually determines the effectiveness
of disciplinary mechanisms to work well (Borisova
et al., 2015). This view is grounded on the notion
that government ownership serves as an implicit
guarantee that allows management to escape from
potential default consequences (Stiglitz, 1993). Fur-
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  Non-listed  Listed   
_cons Coeff. 0.34  0.21  
 z-value 1.38  1.82  
CHAIND Coeff. -0.03  0.01  
 z-value -1.60  0.33  
COMIND Coeff. -0.01  -0.09 c 
 z-value -0.45  -1.74  
COMSZ Coeff. -0.01  0.01  
 z-value -1.20  1.14  
SCRANK Coeff. -0.02 b -0.01 b 
 z-value -2.06  -2.11  
ACSZ Coeff. -0.01  -0.01  
 z-value -1.55  -0.73  
OWN5 Coeff. -0.28  -0.11 c 
 z-value -1.13  -1.87  
BRCH Coeff. 0.01 a 0.00  
 z-value 3.40  0.71  
FRAGE Coeff. 0.04 c 0.00  
 z-value 1.85  -0.15  
DTE Coeff. 0.01 b 0.01 a 
 z-value 2.36  4.57  
Constant  Yes  Yes  
Year-FE  Yes  Yes  
R2 –overall  0.45  0.24  
Wald chi2  57.78  43.35  
Prob> chi2  0.00  0.00  
Table 4. Regressions of Bank’s Performance on Board Characteristics
ther, Borisova et al. (2012) posit that government
controlled firm is more likely to put anti-takeover
provision and thus prevent external governance
mechanisms to discipline management. In other
words, government ownership might provide man-
agement with less incentive to perform well and,
accordingly, is more likely to omit beneficial effect
of board monitoring. Therefore, it is reasonable to
predict that the presence of government ownership
might affect the relationship between board char-
acteristics and organizational outcome. To test this
proposition, we rerun our model by decomposing
the sample into two equal group based on the pres-
ence of government ownership, the results are pre-
sented in Table 5. Column 1 reports estimates of
subsample without government ownership and col-
umn 2 displays the results of banks with govern-
ment ownership. The models are significant at 0.001
level and explains 23 percent (column 1) and 26 per-
cent (column 2) variations in accounting perfor-
mance.
In the absence of government ownership, the
results suggest that there is no significant effect of
chairperson independence (CHAIND, z-value= -
0.50), board independence (COMIND, z-value= -
0.78), and board size (COMSZ, z-value= -0.72). How-
ever, we note that our measure of school rank sig-
nificantly is related to return on equity at 1 percent
(z-value= -2.63). The negative sign indicates that
board chairperson graduated from top rank college
is more likely to deliver better accounting perfor-
mance. By contrast, in the bank with government
ownership, we find that independent chairperson
is associated with lower accounting performance
(CHAIND, z-value= -2.68). The effect of board in-
dependence (COMIND, z-value= -0.78) and board
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  Nogov  Gov  
_cons Coeff. 0.19 B 0.34 b 
 z-value 2.19  2.26  
CHAIND Coeff. -0.01  -0.04 a 
 z-value -0.50  -2.68  
COMIND Coeff. -0.03  -0.03  
 z-value -0.78  -0.78  
COMSZ Coeff. 0.00  0.00  
 z-value 0.72  -0.70  
SCRANK Coeff. -0.01 A -0.01 c 
 z-value -2.63  -1.68  
ACSZ Coeff. 0.00  -0.02 b 
 z-value -0.38  -2.05  
OWN5 Coeff. -0.05  0.16 b 
 z-value -0.94  2.12  
BRCH Coeff. 0.00  0.00  
 z-value 1.23  -0.33  
FRAGE Coeff. -0.01  -0.03  
 z-value -0.88  -1.35  
DTE Coeff. 0.00 A 0.01 a 
 z-value 2.71  3.56  
Year- FE  Yes  Yes  
      
R2–overall  0.23  0.26  
Wald chi2  37.23  41.90  
Prob> chi2  0.00  0.00  
Table 5. Regressions of Bank’s Performance on Board Characteristics
size (COMSZ, z-value= -0.70). School rank remains
an important predictor of firm performance al-
though the level of significance decreases (SCRANK,
z-value= -1.68, p= 10 percent).
DISCUSSION
Descriptive statistics reveals that the distri-
bution of ROE displays a modest variation across
banks regarding the accounting performance they
achieve. Surprisingly, outsider-dominated board is
a common practice in Indonesian banking
industryand the variation across firms is low. Over-
all, although the rank of awarding universities quite
varies across sample, yet chairpersons in banking
industry is well educated. Lastly, prevalence of ex-
cessive ownership concentration is evident in Indo-
nesian banking industry.
Unconditional step-wise analysis reveal that
chairperson independence, the proportion of inde-
pendent directors, and board size do not serve as
determinants of accounting return. In contrast, bet-
ter accounting return is more likely to be observed
in the bank with board chairperson graduated from
highest rank universities (better quality). The re-
sults remain unchanged across individual and simul-
taneous tests. This suggests that the results are less
likely to suffer from interplay effects among gover-
nance mechanisms. Further, I take the strength of
market for corporate control into account. First, I
decompose sample into two groups based on list-
ing status. This test is grounded on the premise that
listed firms face higher scrutiny and performance
pressure. Therefore, it is asserted that scrutiny and
pressure would put listed firms to be more aligned
to market for corporate control. In both groups,
personal characteristics of directors (chairperson
independence, board independence, and board size)
remain exhibiting insignificant estimation consis-
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tently of accounting performance while the signifi-
cant effect of university rank persists. The finding
thus confirms that the association between board
characteristics and is insensitive to the presence of
different listing status. Next, I split the sample into
two equal group based on the presence of govern-
ment ownership. It is claimed that government
ownership might grant management with less ac-
countability from business failure. Therefore, this
view suggests that the existence of government
ownership might reduce the strength of market for
corporate control. The analysis reveals that chair-
person independence, board independence, board
size is insignificant while board chairperson from
top rank school have a positive effect on accounting
return in subsample firms with government owner-
ship. In the presence of government ownership, the
results of board independence and board size per-
sist while chairperson independence, however, be-
comes negative predictor of dependent variable.
One plausible explanation of this pattern is that in-
dependent board chairperson is more likely to suf-
fer from information problem (Raheja, 2005), that
eventually prevent the chairperson to set up robust
monitoring agenda. Another explanation is that poor
performing banks simply put independent director
to serve as board chairperson in order to convince
market that they aware of governance problem, of
which might result in underperforming achievement
(Prabowo & Simpson, 2011).The rank of college re-
mains positive.
Taken together, the results tell several points.
First, board independence, board size is insignifi-
cant determinant of accounting return consistently.
Second, the effect of chairperson independence on
ROE might be sensitive to different population.
Third, the rank of schoolboard chairperson attended
serve as credible predictor of firm performance ir-
respective to the existence of other governance
mechanisms and the strength of market for corpo-
rate control.
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS
Conclusion
In this paper, I examine the effect of chairper-
son independence, overall board independence,
board size, and chairperson education on return on
equity in banking industry in Indonesia. The un-
derlying framework borrows from agency theory
postulating that independent directors might shape
board monitoring effectiveness. Board size has been
quoted as bringing knowledge and skill diversity
although, on the other hand, might raise coordina-
tion and communication issues. The rank of college
the chairperson graduated might serve as a proxy
for cognitive ability of chairperson that is necessary
for coordinating and setting monitoring strategy and
agenda. The sample is based on the dataset com-
prising banks operating in Indonesia during 2009-
2015, of which bank-years with unavailable annual
and necessary report are omitted, resulting in the
final sample consisting of 86 banks (520 observa-
tions).
Further, I winsorized all continuous variables
at the 1st and 99th percentiles to address possible
outliers issue. Using panel data regressionsin un-
conditional estimation, I find that chairperson in-
dependence, the proportion of independent direc-
tors, and board size are insignificant predictors of
bank accounting performance while the rank of uni-
versity board chairperson attended shows a signifi-
cant effect on accounting return.
To test the robustness of the results, further
analysis reveals that the effect of board characteris-
tics on accounting performance is moderated by the
strength of market for corporate control. I address
this issue by introducing listing status and govern-
ment ownership, of which are expected to produce
variation in the strength of market for corporate
control. The results remain unchanged; chairperson
independence, the proportion of independent di-
rectors, and board size are insignificantly related
to bank performance while the rank significantly
Jurnal Keuangan dan Perbankan | PERBANKAN
Vol. 22, No. 1, January 2018: 114–126
| 124 |
affects accounting return. However, I find that the
effect ofuniversity rank board chairperson attended
on bank performance is more pronounced in the
bank without government ownership.
Suggestions
While the results are robust to variation in
the market for corporate control, the analysis might
suffer from endogeneity issue. For example, poor
performing banks might simply add independent
director to serve as board chairperson in order to
convince market that they aware of governance
problem. Another example is that directors gradu-
ated from top rank college might have better access
to join reputable bank with profitable record. If this
is a case, the analysis might produce biased-estima-
tion that stems from reverse causality (Wintoki,
Linck, & Netter, 2012; Lau, Shrestha & Yu, 2016).
Therefore, future research addressing those short-
comings would be of worth of governance litera-
ture.
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